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Abstract
This paper shows how a popular system of federal revenue equalization grants can
limit tax competition among subnational governments, correct fiscal externalities,
and increase government spending. Remarkably, an equalization grant can
implement efficient policy choices by regional governments, regardless of a wide
variety of differences in regional tax capacity, tastes for public spending, and
population. Thus, compared to other corrective devices, equalization achieves
“robust” implementation. If aggregate tax bases are elastic, however, equalization
leads to excessive taxation. Efficiency can be achieved by a modified formula that
equalizes a fraction of local revenue deficiencies equal to the fraction of taxes that
are shifted backward to factor suppliers.
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Decentralization of spending powers to lower-level governments is a widespread phenomenon,
one which appears to have become more common in recent years. The beneﬁts of decentralization
are familiar to economists, at least since the work of Tiebout (1956). Decentralization has often
been held to increase the responsiveness of policy to the preferences of citizens, and to increase
accountability in government. Some of the costs of decentralization are also familiar. 1 If gov-
ernment spending must be ﬁnanced from local ﬁscal resources, then it is apt to be distributed un-
equally among regions. But decentralization is known to have potentially negative consequences
for efﬁciency as well as equity. When tax bases are mobile among regions in a federation, then
uncoordinated local policy-making may exert downward pressure on government spending ev-
erywhere, distorting the mix of public and private consumption. Further, unharmonized local
policies can distort the allocation of mobile resources among regions, which leads to failures of
production efﬁciency. These and a variety of other ﬁscal spillovers among regions can make out-
comes Pareto inefﬁcient in a decentralized federation.
A variety of reforms have been proposed to correct these different problems associated with
decentralization. In this paper, we argue that one simple mechanism available to federal govern-
ments—equalization grants—can in a wide variety of circumstances address both the efﬁciency
and equity problems of decentralization.
An equalization grant is a particular system of federal revenue sharing that is already em-
ployed in a number of countries.2 In its idealized form, an equalization system sets the (per capita)
transfer to each government equal to the difference between its measured tax capacity and the av-
erage capacity of all regions, multiplied by some “standard” tax rate, usually equal to the average
of all regions’ tax rates. Thus the program aims to equalize differences in tax revenue, but imple-
ments transfers through an indirect formula, based on differences in observed tax bases. The use
of the standard tax rate accommodates diversity in lower-level governments’ spending patterns:
ideally, equalization makes differences in local tastes, rather than in local ﬁscal capacity, the only
cause of differences in local public spending.
That equalization can make the regional distribution of public goods more equitable should
be clear. Indeed, when all governments choose the same tax rate, the formula guarantees equal
per capita net revenues. The impact of the formula on efﬁciency of tax policies in a world of
mobile tax bases is more subtle, but still straightforward. A tax cut by a single region causes an
inﬂow of the tax base to the region, which mitigates the revenue loss of the tax cut, but at the
expense of government revenues in other regions; this ﬁscal externality is the principal source
of the inefﬁciency. But the increase in tax base relative to the national average also reduces the
deviating government’s entitlement under an equalization formula. This offsets the impact of the
tax cut on own-source revenue, and so tends to increase equilibrium “tax effort” of all regions.
In fact, in a central case, we are able to show that the equalization effect exactly offsets the ﬁscal
externality, making regional governments willing to implement the tax policies that would be
chosen by a unitary central government.
To make this point, we lay out a popular theory of local capital tax competition and consider
the effects of equalization grants on Nash equilibrium tax rates.3 In the canonical version of the
1Oates (1972) is probably the best-known elaboration of the trade-offs involved in allocation of taxing and spending
powers to different levels of government.
2These include Canada, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, and a large number of developing countries. As well, the
equalization formula is the basis of local school district ﬁnance in a number of US states (Card and Payne, 2002).
3The model is originally due to Wilson (1986) and Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986). Here we consider an expanded
2model, capital is in ﬁxed supply to the nation as a whole, but mobile among regions; thus Nash
equilibrium tax rates lie below the level that would be chosen by a unitary central government.
In this environment, we show that an equalization grant induces regional governments to set tax
rates efﬁciently, while simultaneously equalizing revenue among the regions. Thus equalization
decentralizes a central government’s preferred allocation.
Of course, many federal grant systems other than equalization could also be designed to
achieve the optimum; all that must be done is to set the slope of the transfer formula to cor-
rect regional governments’ incentives, and to set the intercept to equalize spending appropriately.
Thus, for example, Wildasin (1991) proposes a system of linear matching grants for local tax rates,
and Figuieres, Hindriks and Myles (2001) a transfer system that pools a fraction of local revenues
and shares it equally among all governments. What is noteworthy about our result is that a simple
equalization formula decentralizes the optimum in a rich set of environments, regardless of the
degree of regional mobility of capital, and regardless of a variety of differences in the tax capaci-
ties and populations of regional governments and the tastes of residents for public spending. Thus
equalization achieves “robust” implementation where other grant formulas do not. The simplicity
of the formula is an attractive feature of equalization, especially when differences among regions
are large and variable over time—which seems to be precisely when such grants are most often
observed in practice.
So far, our results deal with the case of a ﬁxed national tax base that is mobile among regions.
But taxes generally have distortionary effects at the national as well as regional level. We therefore
consider an extended version of the model, in which capital is elastically supplied by consumers,
and we show that full equalization leads to equilibrium tax rates higher than optimal. Even in
this case, however, a simple ﬁx is available: the optimum can be decentralized by a system of
“partial” equalization that compensates regions for a proper fraction of differences in revenue
capacity. The optimal fraction is equal to the fraction of coordinated national tax increases that
is shifted backward to capital owners, a parameter that can be easily estimated. Moreover, the
optimal formula is the same for all jurisdictions, regardless of differences in local tax capacity,
tastes, or population.
Our results have important antecedents in the literature. Smart (1998) shows how an equaliza-
tion grant induces inefﬁciently high tax rates on a tax base that is elastically supplied but immobile
among regions. The direction of the effect in this paper is the same but, because of regional mobil-
ity, the normative implications are quite different. The general notion that federal revenue sharing
can align local government incentives and reduce tax competition is much older, and is discussed
by Brennan and Buchanan (1980), among others. Boadway and Hayashi (2001) and Esteller-Mor´ e
and Sol´ e-Oll´ e (2002) provide evidence that equalization has reduced business tax competition
among provincial governments in Canada. K¨ othenb¨ urger (2002) also establishes our basic result
for the case of identical regions and ﬁxed aggregate capital supply. Here we extend the analysis
to elastic tax bases and show how the effects of equalization are robust to regional inequality and
differences in tastes and population.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model, describes the Nash equi-
librium, and characterizes transfer systems that implement the central government’s optimum.
Section 3 shows how equalization decentralizes the central optimum when the national aggregate
tax bases are ﬁxed. Section 4 extends the argument to elastic tax bases and to regional population
differences. Section 5 concludes the paper.
version of the model that incorporates (elastic) savings behaviour, as in Keen and Kotsogiannis (2001).
32 A model of tax competition in a federation
A federal economy consists of N regions. In each region, ﬁrms produce a single, homogeneous
consumption good with a linear-homogeneous technology, using an immobile factor, land, and a
mobile factor, capital. Since the land input is ﬁxed in each region, we suppress it from notation and
write theaggregate productionof region i as fi(ki), if ki units ofcapital areemployed there. Capital
is paid its marginal product, and residual returns pi(ki) = fi(ki)   ki f 0
i(ki) accrue to landowners.
(The consumption good is the numeraire.)
A single representative citizen resides in each region and is endowed with all of the local land
input and B units of the consumption good. The agent consumes at two dates, both before and
after production takes place. Thus the agent elastically supplies si units of the good for use as
capital by ﬁrms, while consuming the balance c1
i = B   si in the ﬁrst period. Capital moves freely
among regions in the federation and is allocated to maximize returns to capitalists. Accordingly,
in equilibrium, it earns an equal net rate of return r in each jurisdiction, and agents receive total
factor incomes
c2
i = pi(ki) + (1 + r)si (1)
which are available for consumption in the second period. (Observe that there are by assump-
tion no residence-based income taxes in the economy.) Each local government levies a speciﬁc,
source-based tax ti on capital employed in the jurisdiction to ﬁnance spending on the local public
good. Citizens in all jurisdictions have quasi-linear preferences over bundles of public and private
consumption u(c1
i ) + c2
i + bi(gi), where gi is the quantity of a local public good provided in i, and
each bi is a strictly concave function.
To describe market equilibrium, let
v(ki,r) = max
s
fu(B   s) + c2
i : c2
i = pi(ki) + (1 + r)sg
represent the indirect utility of agent i from private consumption, and let s(r) be the associated
utility-maximizing supply of capital. Observe that, because preferences are quasi-linear, optimal
saving is independent of income and so is independent of domestic investment and land rents.
Firms in each jurisdiction choose investment to maximize proﬁt, taking the gross cost of cap-
ital r + ti as given; thus each region’s capital demand function is deﬁned by the usual marginal
condition
ki = fi(r + ti) () f 0
i(ki) = r + ti (2)
Observe that f0
i(r + ti) = 1/f 00
i (ki) < 0. Let S(r) = Ns(r) denote the aggregate supply function for
capital in the federation. Given tax rates t = (t1,...,tN), the capital market in this economy clears
at an interest rate r(t) such that
￿
i
fi(r + ti) = S(r) (3)
which in turn yields the equilibrium investment levels k
i (t) = fi(r(t) + ti). Implicit differentia-




























> 0 j 6= i (6)
Thus a unilateral tax increase in jurisdiction i causes a decline in the equilibrium interest rate,
and investment declines at home but rises elsewhere.
2.1 Nash equilibrium
Local governments are assume to behave non-cooperatively, using the source-based tax rates ti
as their strategic variables. They also respond to a transfer formula chosen by a central gov-
ernment. The timing of events is : ﬁrst, the central government commits to a transfer formula
Ti(t1,t2, ,tN) deﬁning the net transfer to each jurisdiction as a function of the tax rates; second
the jurisdictions choose their tax rates ti simultaneously; third, consumers and ﬁrms make their
saving and investment decisions; fourth, production and consumption take place. The quantity of
public goods provided in jurisdiction i is
gi = tik
i (t) + Ti(t) (7)
Each jurisdiction’s government chooses its tax rate so as to maximize the utility of its citizens,
v(k
i (t),r(t)) + bi(gi)) subject to the budget constraint (7), taking as given the other jurisdictions’




















The left side of equation (8) is the marginal cost, in reduced consumption of the private good
(in the second period), of a tax increase in the jurisdiction. The right side is the marginal beneﬁt
of the increase in public good consumption resulting from the tax increase.4 Note that the transfer
formula will tend to encourage tax effort if the size of the transfer received by the jurisdiction
increases with the jurisdiction’s tax rate.
2.2 Optimal taxes in a unitary state
As a benchmark, consider the optimum for a central government which could set each jurisdic-
tion’s tax rate directly, and which could allocate this tax revenue for public good provision in each
jurisdiction. However the central government is not allowed to transfer income in a lump-sum
fashion among jurisdictions. If each jurisdiction had the same population, and if the central gov-
ernment wished to maximize the sum of people’s utilities in the federation, then it would choose
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The unitary optimum is therefore described by the ﬁrst-order conditions
b0
i(gi) = m (10)
4The left side of the equation must be positive, since equation (4) shows that ¶r/¶ti must be less than 1 in absolute












where m is the Lagrange multiplier on the consolidated government budget constraint (9).
The ﬁrst condition implies that the marginal beneﬁt of the public good is equalized in all juris-
dictions; when preferences for the public good are identical among regions, this implies uniform
provision as well. The second condition (11) implies equalization of the marginal deadweight loss
of each region’s source-based tax ti; in particular, each regional government must internalize the
(positive) effect of tax increases on revenues in other jurisdictions.
Comparing (13) and (6) gives a decomposition of the externalities that each jurisdiction’s tax
policy imposes on the others: if an intergovernmental transfer system T decentralizes the cen-
















(ki   s) (12)
This transfer system implements a marginal subsidy to local tax collections that has a Pigouvian
interpretation. The ﬁrst term in (12) is the external effect of a tax increase in i on revenues collected
in other jurisdictions j 6= i, identiﬁed in Wildasin (1989). The second term, discussed in DePater
and Myers (1994), is the “terms of trade” effect of a tax increase on net capital income in region
i; this effect is positive for a net capital importer and negative for a net exporter. Since exports
from one jurisdiction equal imports by all others, the marginal terms of trade gain to the home
jurisdiction equals the marginal damage imposed on the others, and the Pigouvian subsidy offsets
this pecuniary external effect as well.
2.3 Equalization grants
Equalization grants represent a particular form of transfer. In its idealized form, an equalization
grant system would ensure that each jurisdiction would provide the average level of public goods
for the federation, were the jurisdiction to levy the national average tax rate. This system, which
we will call “full equalization,” therefore implies a transfer of
TE
i = t(k   ki) (13)








If R  ￿tjkj denotes the total tax revenue in the federation, and K  ￿kjthe total capital demand











6Thus equalization pays each jurisdiction a fraction of national revenues equal to the difference
between its population share and its share of the tax base. In what follows, we will also consider
a system of partial equalization, in which a fraction a of differences in local revenue capacity are
equalized, so that Ti = aTE
i .
To understand how equalization affects each government’s incentives in setting taxes, it is use-
ful to consider the marginal change in transfers resulting from a local tax increase. Differentiation




























Comparing the marginal incentives under equalization to the optimal grant system (12) is our
focus in most of what follows.
3 Efﬁcient equalization: The ﬁxed saving case
Inspection of the marginal equalization grant in (15) leaves the effects of transfer far from clear
and, comparingtheoptimalgrantin(12), itmayseemsurprisingthatequalizationcandecentralize
optimal local taxes. To show why this is indeed the case, we ﬁrst consider some simpler cases.
Assume that per capita saving s(r) is independent of the net return r, so that the total quantity
of capital employed, K  ￿j k
j is also ﬁxed in equilibrium. This is sufﬁcient to guarantee that
the optimal tax system is uniform across jurisdictions, so that the allocation of capital achieves
production efﬁciency.5 Thus we have:





i ) = 1
and
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Proof. See the appendix.
It should be clear that the policy described in the lemma satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order conditions
(10)–(11) for optimality; the proof also shows that this is an optimal policy, and that it is the only
optimal policy.
Can this optimum be implemented by an equalization grant? The answer is yes. To under-
stand why this is the case, ﬁrst consider an example in which all jurisdictions have identical pro-
duction technologies and preferences for the public good. (This is the environment considered
by K¨ othenb¨ urger (2002).) Since Lemma 1 implies optimal taxes are uniform (ti = t), and since
technologies are identical, the equilibrium capital allocation is symmetric: ki = K/N for all i. The








to distort the allocation of capital among regions in order to redistribute consumption among local residents. We return
to this point below.
7Faced with an equalization grant, each jurisdiction sets its tax rate to satisfy the ﬁrst-order condi-
tion (8), which simpliﬁes to
ki = b0(gi)ki (16)
Moreover, symmetry implies gi = tK/N for each jurisdiction; thus (16) coincides with the ﬁrst-
order condition (12) describing the unitary optimum tax rate. Therefore, full equalization yields a
Nash equilibrium to the tax-setting game played by the jurisdictions, in which they all choose the
optimal tax rates, and spend the optimal amount on the public good.
In this case, since the equilibrium is symmetric, no transfers are actually paid in equilibrium.
Nevertheless, a deviation by any regional government from the optimal tax rate would induce a
change in transfers that exactly offsets the “base” effect of the tax change t¶k
i /¶ti. Thus each
government optimally behaves as though its tax base were independent of the local tax rate; since
the national base is indeed perfectly inelastic, this induces optimal tax policies.
In reality, equalization grants are typically paid when there are substantial differences in local
tax capacities; it is undoubtedly regional inequality, rather than tax competition, that typically
motivates the transfers. It therefore seems important to incorporate regional inequality into the
analysis. The following result shows that the corrective effect of equalization is robust to (a form
of) differences in regional investment demands. We assume that regional capital demands are of
the multiplicative form fi(r) = Aif(r) for some parameters Ai; this guarantees that the elasticity
of tax bases is the same in all regions, even though the level of tax bases may differ. The following
result shows that equalization decentralizes the optimal tax system in this case, regardless of the
distribution of regional productivity levels Ai.
Proposition 1 Suppose that saving is perfectly inelastic, all jurisdictions have identical preferences for the
public good b(gi), and regional capital demand functions satisfy
fi(r) = Aif(r) (17)
for some parameters such that ￿i Ai = N and some function f. Then full equalization implements the
unitary optimum.
Proof. Since saving is inelastic, the unitary optimal policy sets m = b0(gi) = 1 for all i. Since optimal

































where the last equality uses the multiplicative form of productivity differences (17). Finally, ob-
serve that when tax rates are uniform transfers equalize government spending in all jurisdictions
to gi = tK/N. Thus equalization decentralizes the unitary optimal policies. 2
8It is perhaps not particularly surprising that a revenue sharing program, if correctly designed,
can cause local governments to account for the externality their decisions about tax rates impose
on the revenues accruing to other governments. But the problem in this environment is more
complex: in addition to the ﬁscal externality, local tax policies are distorted by the pecuniary
externality among regions. Because local tax cuts exert some positive effect on the rate of return to
capital in the nation, low-productivity, capital exporting regions prefer lower capital taxes than do
high-productivity, capital importing regions. This effect is independent of the direct effect of tax
cuts on local tax bases and on government revenues. Nevertheless, the proposition shows that an
equalization grant causes regional governments to internalize the pecuniary externality as well.
Of course, any grant system which achieved the appropriate “Pigouvian” marginal subsidy to
local tax collections, as described by (12), and which equalized the marginal beneﬁt of the public
good in all regions, would decentralize the unitary optimum. Thus an equalization grant does not
uniquely implement the optimum. For example, Figuieres, Hindriks and Myles (2001) show how
the optimum can be achieved through a grant system which pooled a particular fraction of local
tax revenues and redistributed it on an equal per capita basis.6 But decentralization through rev-
enue pooling requires the federal government to observe the elasticity of local tax base function
f and to set the share of revenues to be pooled appropriately; equalization achieves the opti-
mum more parsimoniously. When regional tax bases are unequal, moreover, an optimal system
of revenue pooling would require the grant formula to be differentiated among regions, whereas
equalization is robust to regional inequality.
In the model presented here, it has been assumed that tax rates are the strategic variables in
the non-cooperative game played by regional governments. It is known that the Nash equilibrium
allocation is in general sensitive to whether regional governments conjecture that other regions
are holding tax rates constant, or holding the level gj of public expenditure constant, or some
combination of the two. Figuieres, Hindriks and Myles (2001) have shown that the appropriate
central government remedy will differ in each of these cases as well. However, a virtue of the
equalization formula TE
i is that, when regions are identical and saving is ﬁxed, its efﬁciency does
not depend on the choice of strategic variable by the regions. This invariance is the consequence of
the fact that marginal changes in one region’s tax rate have no effect at all on the budget constraint
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since ti = ¯ t and ¯ k = k
i at the optimum, if regions are identical. Thus ﬁscal spillovers are absent
under full equalization, if ¯ k is ﬁxed. Because marginal changes in region j’s tax rate do not affect
any other region’s budget constraint, region j’s conjectures about the other regions’ behaviour do
not matter: whatever the conjecture, deviations by region j would have no effect on the levels of
the strategic variables chosen by the other regions.
Furthermore, equalization decentralizes the unitary optimum even in cases where the central
government lacks sufﬁcient information to impose optimal taxes directly. In the environment of
Proposition 1, suppose that willingness to pay for the public good b(gi) were common to all re-
gions and observed by regional but not federal authorities.7 Since the optimal tax rate satisﬁes
b0(tK/N) = 1, achieving the optimum requires local information. Since the marginal subsidy
provided by the equalization grant is scaled automatically by the average tax rate of all jurisdic-
6They consider ﬁscal competition for mobile workers rather than capital, but the model is formally equivalent.
7See Bucovetsky, Marchand and Pestieau (1998) for a full model along these lines.
9tions, an equalization grant is an indirect mechanism achieving (Bayesian) implementation of the
unitary optimum.
4 Partial equalization: The variable saving case
4.1 The main result
Our previous results show that, when the national tax base in perfectly inelastic, an equalization
grant decentralizes the optimum by compensating regional governments for increasing tax rates
in such a way that they behave as if their own tax bases were inelastic, despite regional mobility
of capital. But even coordinated national increases in capital tax rates have distortionary effects,
when saving is elastically supplied. Can equalization provide the right incentives for regional
governments in this environment?
When s0(r) > 0, characterizing optimal policies is more complicated, and tax rates need not be
uniform in general. Manipulating the ﬁrst-order conditions (11) for the planner’s problem gives
the following “inverse elasticity” expression for optimal tax rates.
















where m = b0(g
i ) for all i.
Proof. See the appendix.
When regional productivity differences take the multiplicative form (17), it is immediate from
(19) that a uniform tax system again satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order conditions. Under an additional con-
dition, it can be shown that the optimum involves tax rates that are uniform across jurisdictions:








whenever ti  tj. It follows that t
i = t
j at any solution to (19).9
When saving is elastically supplied, full equalization tends to “oversubsidize” local tax in-
creases and hence to result in equilibrium tax rates higher than optimum levels. To see this, con-
sider again the case of identical regions. At any uniform tax system, the marginal equalization















8This condition will hold if the Hicks–Allen elasticity of substitution s between capital and land in production
(deﬁned so as to have a positive sign) is a non-decreasing function of the cost of capital r, and if s is everywhere less
than or equal to 1.
9If f were not log-concave, then there would still exist a solution to the central government’s ﬁrst-order conditions
involving equal tax rates. However, there would be no guarantee that every solution to those conditions must have
equal tax rates.











Since K is decreasing in ti, equilibrium tax rates must exceed optimal levels. This echoes the results
in Smart (1998).
Nevertheless, a simple r´ egime of partial equalization can decentralize the optimum in this
more general case, where the fraction of revenues to be equalized depends (only) on the semi-







(Note that by convention these are measured as non-negative numbers.)
Proposition 2 Suppose regional productivity differences take the multiplicative form (17). The unitary
optimum can be decentralized by a system of partial equalization grants Ti = aTE









Proof. See the appendix.





which is the fraction of coordinated national tax increases that are shifted backward to capital
owners in equilibrium. The greater the degree of backward tax incidence, the less distortionary
is the tax, and the higher the optimal rate of partial equalization. A particular implication of
Proposition 2 is that, when capital is in perfectly elastic supply to the nation (the small open
economy case), equalization grants should not be paid.
4.2 General technologies – and many regions
Suppose now that regional productivity differences do not take the particular multiplicative form
speciﬁed in (17). It need not be true that each region should levy the same tax rate, and it need not
be true that the equalization formula must be uniform, at the rate a.
11Equation (19) still characterizes the utilitarian optimum. The question addressed in this section
is what form of equalization grant will implement the optimal tax rule (19) in this general case.
It will be assumed here that there are a ﬁxed number M of production functions, where the
number M may be arbitrarily large, but is ﬁnite. Each of the N regions has a production function
drawn from this set of M possible functions. Each of the regions has the same population, 1, the
same endowment B of the consumption good, and the same quasi-linear preferences u(c1) + c2 +
b(g) for its residents. In this section, “small” regions will be considered, by increasing the number
N of regions. (The number M of possible technologies will be held ﬁxed, just as the number of
types of consumer is held constant when the number of consumers is increased, as in much of the
literature on core equivalence in large exchange economies.)
The optimal transfer system must satisfy condition (12), as before. However, as the number of
regions grows large, ¶r/¶ti approaches zero in (4), and the second term vanishes from the optimal
equalization formula: Since small regions cannot affect the terms of trade for capital imports, a
utilitarian central government need not correct for the pecuniary externality. On the other hand,




























es + ¯ ed
where ¯ ed is here deﬁned as (minus) the semi-elasticity of aggregate capital demand ￿fj. Rearrang-






i ) as N ! ¥ (21)
What of incentives for small regions under an equalization grant TE
i = ¯ t(¯ k   ki)? Analogous
arguments show that the marginal effect of ti on the average tax rate ¯ t and average tax base ¯ k





i(r + ti) (22)
Comparison of equations (21) and (22) then gives the limiting result:
Proposition 3 As the number of regions N grows large, the formula which implements the utilitarian
optimum approaches partial equalization of tax bases at the same rate in all regions, with that rate equal to
a˜ t/¯ t.
12When regional inequalities in productivity take an arbitrary form, and capital is elastically
supplied, then the central planner typically prefers regional governments to levy non-uniform
tax rates. Nevertheless, the optimum can be decentralized, at least asymptotically, by a uniform
system of equalization grants. The fraction of revenues to be equalized is however smaller than in
the case of uniform taxes. From the central planner’s optimality condition (19), regions with low













In this sense, greater inequality among regions undermines the case for tax base equalization.
4.3 Decentralization as a commitment device
In most of the cases studied in this paper, there is no informational advantage to decentraliza-
tion: a federal government with sufﬁcient information to design optimal transfers could simply
implement the optimal (though possibly non-uniform) tax rates directly through a unitary system
of government. Thus the case for decentralization must rest on other grounds. One motivation
frequently pointed to in the literature is the “market-preserving” role of federalism (Qian and
Weingast, 1997; Kehoe, 1989): in the presence of a variety of political failures, inter-jurisdictional
competition places constraints on the powers of government that may be desirable. Of course,
unfettered competition among governments is unlikely to be optimal in such circumstances; here
we argue that equalization grants will also be required.
To make this point, we consider a problem of commitment failure in capital taxation. The setup
of the model is the same as in Section 3, but with identical tastes and technologies for simplicity,
and with a change in the order of moves. Now, tax rates are chosen after investors have made
their savings decision; investments are irreversible but are freely mobile among regions of the
federation after tax rates have been announced.
Withthistiming, governmentsperceivetheelasticityofcapitalsupplytobezerowhentaxrates
are chosen. Lemma 1 shows that a central government with powers of taxation would impose a
uniform tax in all regions at the rate t = b0 1(1)/s. Comparing the full commitment optimal tax
(19) shows that taxes would be too high and, in equilibrium, savings would be too low.
Now suppose that the central government can commit to transfer its tax powers to the regions,
and to an equalization formula, prior to investments being sunk. From the perspective of regional
governments, the aggregate supply of capital will still be ﬁxed but mobile among regions. Using
















Suppose therefore that the federal government had committed to equalize some fraction a of tax
base differences. The ﬁrst-order conditions (8) describing Nash equilibrium tax rates become
ki = b0(g)






13The ﬁrst-order conditions (13) characterizing optimal tax rates under full commitment are un-







The two expressions are equivalent when






As the number of regions N grows large, the optimal equalization formula approaches that of
the fullcommitment case. For ﬁnite N, however, thefederal government shouldequalize a smaller
fraction of capacity differences, in order to counteract the tendency of regional governments to
perceive tax base elasticities as smaller than they actually are. In fact, the optimal fraction in (23)
is negative whenever
es > (N   1)ed
As es ! ¥ (the case of a small open economy), a approaches its lower bound  1/(N   1).
4.4 Regional population differences
While partial equalization can implement the utilitarian optimum with elastic saving, when juris-
dictions differ in taste for the public good, or (multiplicative) in technology, the equalization must
be supplemented by lump-sum grants, which vary with a jurisdiction’s characteristics. However,
there is one case in which partial equalization alone is sufﬁcient, even when jurisdictions differ in
at least one respect. Suppose that each jurisdiction has the same tastes and technology, but that the
jurisdictions have different population. In this case, not only is the Nash equilibrium inefﬁcient
in the absence of transfers, it also involves tax rates differing among jurisdictions.10 In this case,
then, there are some inequalities for transfers to equalize.
Modifying slightly the notation of the previous sections, let ki and gi denote the per capita capi-
tal stock and public goods consumption in jurisdiction i. Let ni denote the population of the juris-
diction, relative to the average, so that ￿i ni = N. The utilitarian optimum is now ￿i ni[vi(k
i ,r)+
bi(gi)]. Maximizing this subject to the aggregate budget constraint ￿i ni(tik
i   gi) = 0 leads to the











Now the effect of a jurisdiction’s tax rate on the net rate of return, obtained from differentiation






S0(r)   ￿j njf0
j(r + tj)
(25)
In this more general environment, Lemma 2 continues to hold: in particular, the optimal tax sys-
tem is uniform among jurisdictions when technologies are everywhere identical. But, if there
10See Wilson (1991), or Bucovetsky (1991).
11The expressions for the effect of a tax change on the equilibrium capital allocation deﬁned in (5) and (6) continue to
hold, with ¶r/¶ti deﬁned by equation (25) instead of (4).
14were no transfers among jurisdictions, then tax rates could not be equal in any Nash equilibrium:
If ti = tj and if ni > nj then (using (6) and (25)) the right-hand side of the optimality condition (8)
would be greater for the larger jurisdiction, while the left-hand sides of the equation would be the
same. Thus larger jurisdictions levy higher taxes in a Nash equilibrium without transfers, since
they internalize more of the effects of tax increases than do small regions.
The formulae for equalization rules must also be modiﬁed slightly: Let K = ￿i niki denote
the national total (not per capita) tax base. Equation (13) deﬁnes each government’s per capita
entitlement, where the national weighted-average tax rate is now ¯ t = ￿i nitiki/K and the per
capita tax base is ¯ k = K/N. Similarly, the revenue-sharing representation of the formula (14)
holds where R = ￿i nitik
i is national total revenue. With these deﬁnitions, the expression (15) for
the marginal equalization grant continues to hold. We then have the following result.
Proposition 4 If jurisdictions differ in population, but not in tastes or technologies, then the utilitarian




Furthermore, no additional lump-sum transfers are required to achieve the optimum.
Proof. From Lemma 2, the tax rates in all jurisdictions should be equal at the optimum. When tax





































s0   f0 (28)
Under partial equalization at the rate a, the Nash equilibrium has each jurisdiction choosing a
tax rate such that equation (8) holds, with Ti = aTE







when all tax rates are equal, so that the Nash equilibrium satisﬁes the optimality condition (26)
under partial equalization at the rate a. Since this equilibrium has each jurisdiction levy the
same tax rate, therefore all jurisdictions have the same tax revenue per person, and thus the same
level g
i of public good provision per person. Equalizing all tax revenue at the rate a leads to a
Nash equilibrium in which every jurisdiction levies the same tax rate, and where the tax revenue
in each jurisdiction is the efﬁcient g
i , whatever is the population distribution, thus proving the
proposition. 2
155 Conclusion
Intergovernmental transfer systems are most often designed to increase equality of ﬁscal oppor-
tunities among regions. Typically, in economic models, equity objectives such as this are achieved
only at some cost in economic efﬁciency; but in the case of intergovernmental grants that con-
clusion may well be reversed. When tax bases are mobile among regions, local tax effort creates
a positive ﬁscal externality for others, and so tax effort is undersupplied in equilibrium. In this
context, our analysis shows that a particular simple and commonly used system of tax base equal-
ization grants creates an incentive for local governments to enhance tax effort, to the beneﬁt of all
in the nation. Indeed, if tax bases are regionally mobile but ﬁxed in the aggregate, an equalization
grant induces efﬁcient behaviour by all local governments, without recourse to dictates from a
central government about what tax policies should be adopted locally.
While the simplicity of this result is striking, the general conclusion is as expected. There will
always be some grant formula (and in fact there will be many) that decentralize the unitary op-
timum policies. More remarkable is that our result continues to hold (at least when the tax base
elasticity is the same in all regions) regardless of the pattern of regional inequality and of popula-
tion among regions, and regardless of nation-wide shocks to the demand for public goods and to
the elasticity of capital demand. This reﬂects two features of an equalization grant based on the
representative tax system. First, because transfers are proportional to the average of local tax rates,
the incentives embodied in the system scale naturally to the magnitude of ﬁscal externalities, even
as the size of government desired by citizens changes. Second, the marginal subsidy to local taxes
provided by equalization is larger when a local jurisdiction’s tax base deﬁciency is larger. Thus
an equalization also naturally counters the pecuniary externality among regions that causes small
and low-productivity regions to impose a lower tax rate than large and high-productivity ones.
Again, in the model we consider, this offset is exact: an equalization grant precisely internalizes
both the ﬁscal and pecuniary externalities facing all regions.
Equalization grants therefore achieve “robust” implementation of optimal tax policies in a
federation, while other grant formulas would not. This fact might explain the apparent popularity
of equalization grants throughout the world, compared to other redistributive transfer systems.
The results just described apply only in the case that the nation-wide tax base is unaffected
by coordinated national tax increases. When taxes also have distortionary effects at the national
level, our conclusions are modiﬁed. A system of partial equalization grants can then decentralize
optimal taxes, where the fraction of base deﬁciencies to be equalized is the same for all regions
and equal to the fraction of national tax increases that are shifted backward to factor suppliers. In
this case, however, a standard tradeoff between equity and efﬁciency is restored: without supple-
mentary lump-sum grants, an equalization system that provides efﬁcient incentives would leave
some tax base inequalities unaddressed, whereas a fully equalizing transfer system would induce
excessive local taxation.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Given that the aggregate capital stock K is ﬁxed, and the concavity of the
production functions fi(ki), aggregate output ￿j fj(kj) is maximized if and only if the tax rates are
equal across all jurisdictions. So the central government can always improve upon any policy in
which tax rates are not all equal; if t = (t1,t2,... tN) is any vector of tax rates, set
t0
1 = t0
2 =  = t0
N = (￿tjk
j(t))/K
16and the same tax revenue will be raised as with the tax vector t, so that the same vector of public
good levels gi can be ﬁnanced. Since the tax vector t0 leads to a higher total level of output that







Therefore, all tax rates must be equal at any solution to the central government’s optimization
problem.When the tax rates are equal, then the ﬁrst order conditions (10) and (11) become b0
i(gi) =
1 for all jurisdictions i, so that the unique solution is for each gi to equal g
i and for each tax rate to
equal K/(￿j g
j ). 2










where we have used the expressions (4)–(6) for the derivatives of the equilibrium investment



























S0   ￿i f0
i
S0 S (31)













Proof of Proposition 2. When productivity differences take the multiplicative form, Lemma 2
implies that optimal taxes are uniform. With uniform taxes, the marginal transfer (12) required to
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